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Sacred Trust or Sacred Right?
Some natural tears they dropp’d, but wip’d them soon;
The World was all before them, where to choose
Thir place of rest, and Providence thir guide:
They hand in hand with wand’ring steps and slow,
Through Eden took thir solitarie way.
—John Milton, Paradise Lost
Edward Walker was a minor when, in 1838, he went to work at sea. Upon his return, his father, Joseph Walker, claimed Edward’s wages for his 
own use. Joseph made what charitably might be called a private settlement 
with the owner of the Etna, the ship on which Edward had served. Edward 
disputed the settlement, claiming the wages as his own. The federal district 
court made note of the general proposition that a father was “entitled to 
the earnings of his child by virtue of his paternal power.” On this ground, 
Joseph had the right to settle matters on such terms as pleased him. The 
general proposition, however, was not as legally dispositive as he would have 
hoped.1
The court distinguished between the rights and duties of a father. While 
a father’s duties were “indissolubly attached to the paternal relation,” the 
same could not be said of a father’s rights. The rights of the father, accord-
ing to the court, are given to him by the state to enable him to fulfi ll his 
parental duties (“to provide for his child a home, to protect, to maintain, 
and to educate him according to the measure of his ability”), and, as a 
more concrete compensation, the father is allowed “to take the fruits of his 
child’s labor.” But this paternal power is not a “sovereign and independent 
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authority.” It is not, to use the court’s comparison, like the patria potestas 
enjoyed by the father in ancient Rome, “whose law held children to be 
the property of the father, and placed them in relation to him in the cat-
egory of things instead of that of persons.” This sovereign paternal author-
ity, the court declared, “has never been admitted by the jurisprudence of 
any civilized people.” Rather, the father holds only a contingent authority, 
“subject to the restraints and regulation of law,” contingent because it is “in-
separably connected with the parental obligations, and arises out of them.” 
In short, paternal power rests on the fulfi llment of paternal duty. Relying 
on a deep pool of legal theoreticians, treatise writers, and jurists, including 
“[t]he soundest and most esteemed commentators upon the common law,” 
the court affi rmed what, by the time of this dispute, was a well-settled legal 
precept: The power of the parent, because it derives directly from the duty 
to benefi t the child, is limited in scope and duration. It is only as great as is 
needed to secure the child’s welfare: “It is not a power granted to the parent 
for his benefi t, but allowed to him for the benefi t of the child, and it ceases 
when the faculties of the child have acquired that degree of maturity, that 
it may safely be trusted to its own resources. When, therefore, the parent 
abuses this power, or neglects to fulfi l the obligations from which it results, 
he forfeits his rights.”2
For, at bottom, the child does not belong to the parent. The court stressed 
that Edward, like all children, was endowed with a social nature and was 
destined for the enjoyment of a social life. As a member of what the court 
called “the human family,” Edward was invested—endowed by birthright, 
as it were—with all the rights that belong to other members of this universal 
family. The court explained,
The Creator of man, in giving to [the child] a social nature and 
endowing him with those qualities which fi t him for the enjoy-
ment of social life, has imposed upon the parent, as one of the 
conditions of his being, the obligation of providing for his off-
spring while they are incapable of taking care of themselves. But 
his children are not on that account born slaves. They do not 
become the property of the parent. As soon as a child is born, he 
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becomes a member of the human family, and is invested with all 
the rights of humanity.
Thus, when the parent fails to fulfi ll his duty, when he fails to honor the 
human rights and social nature of the child, the “protecting justice of the 
country” will interpose and deprive him of his authority. The court was 
“not aware of any doubt” that the state could take children from their par-
ents and place “them under the care of persons proper to have the control 
of them, and to superintend their education.” Indeed, it was the legal and 
moral responsibility of the court “to remove a guardian who is unfaithful to 
his trust.”3
It is commonly assumed, by academic and lay audiences alike, that par-
ents have long enjoyed a fundamental legal right to control the upbringing 
of their children, but this reading of the law is sorely incomplete and anach-
ronistic. Cases like that of Edward Walker suggest that if by “fundamental” 
we designate rights with a deep historical pedigree, the right to parent free 
from state interference cannot be numbered among them. What is deeply 
rooted in our legal traditions and social conscience is the idea that the state 
entrusts parents with custody of the child, and the concomitant rule that 
the state does so only as long as parents meet their legal duty to take proper 
care of the child. Whether custodial authority was called a power or a right,4 
it was made contingent on the welfare of the child and the needs of the 
state. “[T]he right of parents, in relation to the custody and services of their 
children,” Joseph Story wrote in 1816, “are rights depending upon the mere 
municipal rules of the state, and may be enlarged, restrained, and limited as 
the wisdom or policy of the times may dictate.” Custodial authority, main-
tained the nineteenth-century libertarian treatise writer Christopher Tiede-
man, “is not the natural right of the parents; it emanates from the State, and 
is an exercise of police power.”5
These assertions of the ordinariness of parental authority are not isolated 
instances. Reviewing the case law of the nineteenth century, Lewis Hoch-
heimer, whose treatise on the law of child custody was a familiar reference 
for courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, concluded 
that “[t]he general result of the American cases may be characterized as 
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an utter repudiation of the notion, that there can be such a thing as a pro-
prietary right of interest in or to the custody of an infant.”6 It is true of our 
legal past—as it is true today—that claims of right (natural and civil) were 
advanced in support of parental power.7 But, as Hochheimer tells us, the 
prevailing legal current, driven by the equitable force of trust principles, 
swept away such “narrow contentions”: “The entire tendency of the Ameri-
can courts is, to put aside with an unsparing hand all technical objections 
and narrow contentions whereby it may be attempted to erect claims of sup-
posed legal right, on a foundation of wrong to persons who are a peculiar 
object of the solicitude and protecting care of the law.”8
Traditionally, for both legal scholars and jurists the very word “trust” was 
something of a linguistic charm to ward away rights-thinking. For James 
Kent, the duty to provide for the maintenance and education of the child is 
“a sacred trust”; it is the “true foundation of parental power,” the source of 
the authority that the law “has given” to parents. The parent is “absolutely 
bound” to serve the child. For Story, parents are only “entrusted with the 
custody of the persons and the education of their children” and only as long 
as they properly take care of the child. “Why,” Story asks, “is the parent by 
law ordinarily entrusted with the care of his children?” His is a simple an-
swer: “Simply, because it is generally supposed, that he will best execute the 
trust reposed in him; for, that it is a trust, and of all trusts the most sacred, no 
one can well doubt.” For Hochheimer, proprietary principles were a legal 
remnant of an antiquated family law; in their place the law had substituted 
“the idea of trust as the controlling principle in all controversies in relation 
to such custody.” “In true legal conception,” he writes, “[the parent] is sim-
ply the agent or trustee of the government.” For Tiedeman, “[t]he parent 
has no natural vested right to the control of the child”; parental control is 
“in the nature of a trust, reposed in [the parent] by the State . . . , which may 
be extended or contracted, according as the public welfare may require.”9 
Likewise, and quite early in our juridical history, courts were equally com-
mitted to the word and the concept.10 By the mid-nineteenth century the ju-
risdiction of the courts “to remove infant children from the custody of their 
parents, and to superintend their education and maintenance” was not only 
“well established” but also considered “indispensable to good order and the 
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just protection of society.” This jurisdiction “proceed[ed] upon the theory 
that the right of guardianship is a trust for the benefi t of the child, and the 
parent is not at liberty to abuse it.”11
On this basis, the Etna court was fully prepared to protect the interests of 
Edward Walker against the claims of his father. When parents fail “to fulfi l 
the obligations from which [parental power] results,” the court observed, 
the state—as parens patriae, as parent of the country—has a “deep inter-
est” to ensure that its grant of authority is not abused.12 Joseph Walker, it 
turned out, had not fulfi lled the responsibility entrusted to him, and the 
court awarded Edward his just compensation.
Under a trust model of parent-child relations, biology does not beget 
rights. It begets responsibilities. The trust model is built on the Lockean 
principle that it is the child who has a fundamental right (what William 
Blackstone called a “perfect right”): the right to appropriate parental care, 
including the entitlement to an education that will prepare the child for 
eventual enfranchisement from parental authority. To Locke, the “right of 
Tuition” is “rather the Priviledge of Children, and Duty of Parents, than any 
Prerogative of Paternal Power.”13 (It is a noteworthy piece of American legal 
history that the child’s entitlement to a proper education and the conse-
quent affi rmative duty of the state to provide a proper public schooling—a 
striking break with negative constitutionalism—have long been enshrined 
in our states’ political charters.)14 What biology begets is a duty to ensure 
the child’s best interests. “The terms ‘right’ and ‘claim,’ when used in this 
connection [that is, the custody of children],” declared Hochheimer, “ac-
cording to their proper meaning, virtually import the right or claim of the 
child to be in that custody or charge which will subserve its real interests.”15 
In this connection, then, custodial authority is not a right at all. It is, Hoch-
heimer tells us, “a grant of power fl owing from the state, a portion of the 
state’s protective care and guardianship.”16
The idea that, historically, American law embodied a strict regime of 
parental rights is not easily dislodged. As formidable a scholar as Martha 
Fineman has written that, “[h]istorically, fathers were entitled to posses-
sion of their children. . . . In essence, fathers had an absolute right to their 
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 children, ‘owning’ them as if they held ‘title’ to them.”17 Yet the American 
legal tradition is one that treated paternal absolutism and its rights founda-
tion as barbaric.18 “That the father had any such absolute right to the care 
and custody of his children,” that the state lacked the authority to “control 
the conduct of the father in the education of his children”—these proposi-
tions, Story wrote, “would strike all civilized countries with astonishment.”19 
This confi dent delimitation of the parent’s “ordinary” rights is nowhere bet-
ter seen than in child custody cases, where courts challenged, fi rst, paternal 
authority and, then, parental control of the child generally. At common 
law the father was entitled to the value of his minor children’s labor and 
services, a valuable asset, no doubt;20 but he was entitled to the benefi t of 
the child’s labor “in order the better to discharge his duty.”21 Custody courts 
would not presume that, in fact, the parent was appropriately fulfi lling the 
demands of his role; instead, they would “act according to sound discre-
tion,” consulting the child “if it be of suffi ciently mature age to judge for 
itself.”22 Where the child was too young to choose for itself, it was a judi-
cial commonplace that “the real interest of the child is the principle which 
must govern.”23 The parent retained custody of his—or, as the law evolved, 
her—minor children, but this privilege was granted on the presumption 
that parents act in the best interests of the child—and this was a rebuttable 
presumption. The parental entitlement was good only “so long as [the par-
ent] discharges the obligation imposed upon him by social and civil law.”24 
It is sometimes argued that the paramount right of the parent to direct his 
child’s upbringing without state intervention, absent a showing of harm, 
was so basic as not to need express constitutional protection. In fact, what 
was so basic was parental obligation—“[T]he obligation of parental duty is 
so well secured by the strength of natural affection,” as Kent wrote, “that it 
seldom requires to be enforced by human laws”25—and American custody 
courts, only too content to compare their law with the harsh and technical 
rules of the English cases, had little taste for a harm standard.26
Far from being absolute, the right of the parent was not even the cus-
tody courts’ primary consideration. “The true view,” as one mid-nineteenth-
 century court put it, “is that the rights of the child are alone to be consid-
ered, and those rights clearly are to be protected.” The very idea that parents 
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have rights as parents was called into question. The New York Court for 
the Correction of Errors was not alone when it declared that “there is no 
parental authority independent of the supreme power of the state. But the 
former is derived altogether from the latter.” If parental authority is derived 
from the state, the parent does not obtain rights merely by virtue of being a 
parent. “It is an entire mistake,” Story concluded, “to suppose the court is 
at all events bound to deliver over the infant to his father, or that the latter 
has an absolute vested right in the custody.” Similarly, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania: “[T]he right of parental control is a natural, but not an 
unalienable one.”27
Rather, the parent obtains authority, however it is styled, over the child 
by virtue of acting as a parent. Indeed, it is the child’s entitlement—the 
child’s right “to be surrounded by such infl uences as will best promote its 
physical, mental, and moral development”—that was thought to be in the 
way of a natural vested right. In contrast, the right of the parent “to sur-
round the child with proper infl uences [was] of a governmental nature,” 
in the sense that parental authority over the child was considered a benefi t 
granted by the state in return for parental care of the child.28 This ben-
efi t was subject to the principle—again, the debt is to Locke—that what is 
due the child is defi ned, in a general sense, by basic developmental needs 
and, more particularly, by the developmental needs of the child destined 
from birth to be a member of a liberal constitutional order. Accordingly, 
the metes and bounds of parental duty were not considered a matter solely 
for private determination. (Nor, for that matter, were the legal parameters 
of fi lial duty.)29 Parents in a liberal society, it was assumed, have no right to 
parent as they see fi t.
In the law, there are rights and then there are rights. Not all rights are 
created equal. Most laws or other forms of state action receive a deferential 
review from the courts, despite the fact that they might impinge upon a host 
of personal prerogatives. Under rational basis review, courts presume the 
constitutionality of legislation. The party trying to overcome this presump-
tion must show (1) that the law serves no legitimate purpose or (2) that the 
means employed by the law has no rational relation to the law’s stated goal. 
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But laws or other forms of state action that impinge upon rights considered 
to be fundamental get a far more skeptical judicial reception. Under a strict 
scrutiny standard, courts will presume that such a law is unconstitutional. 
To overcome this presumption, the government must show (1) that the law 
serves a compelling purpose and (2) that the means employed by the law 
are as narrowly tailored as possible to achieve the law’s stated goal. Because 
the hurdle of strict scrutiny is so diffi cult to clear (“strict in theory and fatal 
in fact,” it is commonly, if not entirely accurately, said), the level of review 
employed by the court can easily dictate the outcome of a case.30 So, it is a 
high-stakes determination whether a right is fundamental or not.
The right to parent would be considered an unenumerated right, im-
plicitly protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution (and, both before and after the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, by state constitutional analogues).31 The “liberty” of 
the Due Process Clauses safeguards those substantive rights “ ‘so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ” These are 
rights, like the enumerated freedom of speech, that are considered “of the 
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.”32 Inevitably, whether an unenu-
merated right is so rooted and so essential will be a contested, and probably 
fi ercely contested, question. Inevitably, this is a query with both descriptive 
and normative dimensions. Has the right to parent traditionally been treated 
as fundamental? Should the right to parent be treated as fundamental? This 
book answers no to both questions.
The right to parent as a matter of constitutional law is especially tenu-
ous. The Supreme Court has echoed the popular assumption that the right 
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and nurture of 
their children is a fundamental one, time-honored (“perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”) and honored 
by the work of the Court (“[W]e have recognized the fundamental right 
of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children”).33 But no Supreme Court holding supports this claim. No 
decision, including the case that is the source of the far-reaching assertions 
just parenthetically quoted, has held that the right of parents to make deci-
sions concerning the care of their children is a fundamental one. If the 
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rigor of the Court with regard to the regulation of parental authority has 
varied,34 its scrutiny has never been strict. In fact, as Justice Antonin Scalia 
has observed, there is little decisional support for the notion that the right to 
parent is a “substantive constitutional right” at all, let alone a fundamental 
one.35 More than once, the Court has declined the opportunity to adopt this 
position.36
In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a Nebraska law that 
prohibited both the use of foreign languages as a medium of instruction and 
the study of foreign languages before the eighth grade. These restrictions 
applied to any school, public or private. In 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, the Court struck down Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act, which re-
quired attendance at public schools. Neither case was really brought to the 
Court as, primarily, a matter of parental rights—a litigation choice that itself 
should call into question the well-rootedness of such rights; nonetheless, in 
both cases the court concluded that, under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the state laws unreasonably interfered with the lib-
erty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children.37
But Meyer and Pierce both accept as uncontroversial the principle that 
the state can defi ne and enforce the parental duty to educate. The Meyer 
Court did not question the authority of the state “to compel attendance 
at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, includ-
ing a requirement that they shall give instructions in English.”38 Here, the 
Court reviewed a law that “sought not to require what children must learn 
in schools, but to prescribe, in the fi rst case, what they must not learn.”39 
The question Meyer considers is how far the state can go in dictating what 
the parent can and cannot do.40 The Court answered that the state may not 
set up a standard of education and then prohibit any additional or supple-
mental instruction. If there is a fundamental right at stake in Meyer, it is the 
right of the parent, “after he has complied with all proper requirements by 
the state as to education, to give his child such further education in proper 
subjects as he desires and can afford.”41 In Pierce, the Court pointedly noted 
that the case raised no question “concerning the power of the state rea-
sonably to regulate all schools,” a power that included a very substantial 
measure of curricular control (“that certain studies plainly essential to good 
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citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly 
inimical to the public welfare”).42 If there is a fundamental right at stake in 
Pierce, it is the right of the parent “to provide an equivalent education in a 
privately operated system.”43 Broad claims are made for the legacy of these 
seminal due process cases,44 but, as Justice Byron White put it, Meyer and 
Pierce “lend[] no support to the contention that parents may replace state 
educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of what knowl-
edge a child needs to be a productive and happy member of society.”45
Meyer and Pierce were as much about rhetorical reach as legal doctrine. 
Their anti-statist sentiment would serve as a constitutional banner for those 
marching in support of parental rights. That the Court’s support of a right 
to parent was the product of judicial activism at its most active—indeed, the 
product of a “modern” jurisprudence (built on “more correct ideas” and “a 
truer conception” of the proper functions of government) that would, in a 
self-conscious break with legal tradition, set the stage for a new era of unenu-
merated privacy rights—did not (and does not) deter conservative advocates 
of parental rights from celebrating the cases that rested on this due process 
basis.46 That this right was the product of a Lochner-era constitutionalism 
bent on restricting the police powers of the state—indeed, the product of a 
narrow, natural law individualism (built on the rejection of a centuries-old 
common law legacy of “paternal government”) that would strike down basic 
health and safety regulations—did not (and does not) much bother liberal 
proponents of the right to parent. To parental advocates on both sides of the 
political spectrum, the prerogatives of parenting apparently ease concern 
about doctrinal consistency.47
Meyer and Pierce involved only the general interest of parents in the 
nurture and education of their children. Where nothing more is at stake, 
the Court has said, the state’s authority outweighs due process objections. 
Often, though, more is at stake. Legal claims based on the right to parent 
often come packaged with claims based on other constitutional protections, 
most frequently and forcefully the Free Exercise Clause. Today, religious 
parenting rights enjoy a special constitutional protection from state regula-
tion. State action that burdens religious parenting is subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny.
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Why are restrictions on religious parenting rights subject to heightened 
judicial review? The obvious answer is that the right of religious freedom 
is considered fundamental, but this is only partially correct. The Supreme 
Court has said that state action restricting religious practice is constitution-
ally permissible unless such action directly targets religious practice or dis-
criminates against religious groups. This is the core principle—a contro-
versial one, to be sure—of Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith. Decided in 1990, Smith held that where state 
regulation burdens religious freedom only incidentally—that is, where the 
burden is the incidental effect of regulation that is neutral and generally 
applicable, restricting secular and religious activity alike—the courts will 
presume its constitutionality.48 Thus, for example, a law that makes illegal 
the use of peyote because of safety and health concerns would be subject 
to, and would survive, rational basis review, even though it burdened the 
beliefs and perhaps effectively prohibited the practices of some religious 
groups.
Separately, then, neither the right to parent nor the right of religious free-
dom would trigger strict scrutiny. Combined, however, these rights form 
a tough legal fi rewall that protects parents from state interference in the 
religious upbringing of their children. For the Court has also said that when 
the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim, “more 
than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency 
of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement un-
der the First Amendment.”49 This is the core principle, also a controversial 
one, of Wisconsin v. Yoder. Though Yoder was decided in 1972, its invention 
of a hybrid parenting / free exercise claim survived Smith, as did other varia-
tions on the hybrid rights theme. So, even after Smith, the First Amend-
ment does require heightened scrutiny for claims that involve “not the Free 
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with 
other constitutional protections,” such as the right of parents to direct the 
upbringing and education of their children. In religious parenting cases, by 
some abstruse constitutional calculation, strict scrutiny becomes the norm, 
despite the fact that state action does not target religion or impinge upon a 
fundamental right. Under a strict scrutiny standard, courts will uphold state 
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regulation of religious parenting only where “it appears that parental deci-
sions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for 
signifi cant social burdens.”50 Thus, a law that requires parents to send their 
children to some form of secondary schooling would be subject to, and 
might not survive, strict scrutiny if the parents’ objections to the compulsory 
education requirement are religiously motivated.
Writing for the Court in Smith, Justice Scalia cautioned that our society 
would be courting anarchy if every law or regulation of conduct that nega-
tively affected someone’s religious belief had to be supported by a compel-
ling state interest. To excuse conduct contrary to a general law “ ‘would be 
to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the 
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.’ ”51 
Accordingly, the Smith Court discussed hybrid rights as an exception to 
general constitutional principles. Yet in the universe of religious parenting 
cases, the exception swallows the rule; because such cases are hybrid by 
defi nition, strict scrutiny becomes the norm. The result, if hardly anarchy, 
is the creation of a separate sphere of the law—a constitutional anomaly, 
as Scalia described it—where the government’s ability to protect children 
is subject to an individual parent’s religious beliefs. (Unable to escape this 
unacceptable conclusion, the Yoder Court made a fainthearted attempt to 
limit its holding to the specifi c and peculiar facts of the case before it.)52
If Yoder delivered a special right to religious parents, it did so at some 
cost to the parentalist cause. (I take the term “parentalist” from the strongly 
argued essay by Stephen Gilles titled On Educating Children: A Parental-
ist Manifesto.53 I use the term broadly to designate those who advocate a 
legal and moral regime of considerable deference to parental rights.) For 
the Court’s decision means that the right to parent, by itself, does not enjoy 
a fundamental status, at least where state regulation of education is con-
cerned. Only where the legal question involves the absolute termination of 
parental rights has the Supreme Court required that state action (specifi -
cally, a declaration of parental unfi tness) meet the tough test of justifi ca-
tion associated with strict scrutiny54—though even here, as David Meyer 
has pointed out, the balancing of interests undertaken by the Court “is 
diffi cult to square neatly with the traditional strict-scrutiny formula.”55 In 
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2000, the Court had the opportunity to give parental rights a constitutional 
upgrade. In Troxel v. Granville, the Court considered whether a parent has 
the right to deny visitation rights to a child’s grandparents.56 The decision 
badly disappointed those hoping for a fundamental rights victory. Though 
the Court used the language of fundamental rights, it did not conclude that 
strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review, settling instead for a mere 
presumption in favor of a fi t parent’s visitation choices.
With the Court speaking in uncertain tones, lower courts must contend 
with the fact that “the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the right 
to direct the upbringing and education of one’s children is among those 
fundamental rights whose infringement merits heightened scrutiny.”57 
Protection for parenting rights varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
from claim to claim;58 and courts have more than enough leeway to decide 
the merits of a case by choosing whether to apply a standard based on the 
best interests of the child (rational basis review) or a strict scrutiny harm 
standard.59 Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that some parental 
rights advocates seek to amend the United States Constitution. The Paren-
tal Rights Amendment would declare that “[t]he liberty of parents to direct 
the upbringing and education of their children is a fundamental right,” and, 
consequently, that strict scrutiny would be the standard of review in cases of 
alleged infringement.60
There are good reasons why the right to parent has not enjoyed a funda-
mental status in the law. To begin with, the right to parent is not one but 
many things, a bundle of different interests, each implicating the authority 
of parent and state in different ways and to different degrees. No surprise, 
then, that “[f]ar from the absolutist’s assumption of strict scrutiny for every 
incursion, the Court’s cases reveal a willingness, at least implicitly, to tailor 
the nature and strength of judicial scrutiny to the facts of each family pri-
vacy controversy.” Yet all parental rights cases have one thing in common 
that even more emphatically cautions against strict scrutiny: They involve a 
third party, and one who is unable to defend its own interests. Other liberty 
interests establish a constitutional shield against governmental impairment 
of individual rights, but confl icts involving parental rights—Justice John 
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Paul Stevens made this important if, one would think, self-evident point—
“do not present a bipolar struggle between the parents and the State over 
who has fi nal authority to determine what is in a child’s best interests.”61 
The interests of the child—who may well need the protection of the state, 
not protection from the state—and the state’s interest in the child invariably 
affect the legal reckoning.
By its very nature, the supposed right to parent is a different creature 
from, say, the right of free speech. No one is required to speak responsibly. 
No one is required to speak at all. Yet would anyone object to the proposi-
tion that parents are required to exercise the right to parent responsibly? Or 
that a parent has no right not to parent?62 By defi nition, then, the parent’s 
right to be let alone, to parent free from governmental interference, is and 
must be conditional and limited.63 Far from carrying with it a fundamental 
right, the decision to parent is inevitably a choice to forego rights otherwise 
available to adults. It is always a choice to give up to some extent, and often 
to a great extent, the right of individual choosing. There are compelling rea-
sons why parents want to assume the weighty burden of child rearing, and 
there are good reasons why the state wants to give parents plenty of room 
to do their job; but parental authority over the child is not justifi ed, not in 
our legal tradition and culture, by the proprietary interests of the parent as 
a rights-holder.
Obviously, not every break with the past is a bad thing; and, as Martha 
Minow reminds us, the case against rights can too easily be “levied by people 
who do not want to change existing patterns of hierarchy and domination.”64 
Just as clearly, and our history unhappily bears more than suffi cient tes-
timony to this fact, the parens patriae authority of the state can be badly 
abused. To say that a parental rights orientation is not deeply rooted in our 
traditions, even to say that parental rights as a normative matter should not 
be considered fundamental, is not to declare that a particular policy deci-
sion is right or wrong. It is simply to say that it is a question of policy whether 
and how the state should regulate parent-child relations. Should we allow, 
say, parents to homeschool their children? Is home schooling in the best in-
terests of the child? Perhaps, perhaps not. Should we allow parents to spank 
their children? to compel religious observance, against the wishes of the 
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child or against the wishes of a former spouse? to restrict visitation from third 
parties? The questions are as varied as the myriad duties parents undertake. 
If we think of parenting as a set of responsibilities, not rights, we will not 
all miraculously reach the same legal and cultural prescriptions—fi duciary 
principles do not inexorably lead in an antiparentalist direction;65 individu-
ally, the prescriptions we reach may not always fall into neat ideological 
(conservative or liberal) categories—but we will think of these questions as 
matters fi t for democratic deliberation. To say that a parental rights orienta-
tion is not deeply rooted in our traditions is not to answer these questions. 
It is to ask them. But by giving parents the right to homeschool children 
or compel religious observance or restrict third-party visitation—or, more 
generally speaking, by giving parents the right to bring up their children as 
they want to—parental rights advocates would forestall public debate on 
contentious questions relating to the care and welfare of children. They 
would take these questions out of the public domain by keeping the home 
under constitutional lock and key.66 The question would no longer be one 
of the child’s welfare but of parental entitlement.
This book looks at four related areas of the law: parental custody, state 
regulation of education, religion and parental rights, and nonparental third-
party rights. In each,
1. historically, the authority of the parent has been treated as a
sacred trust, a delegation of state power made on the presump-
tion that it will be employed to promote the eventual enfran-
chisement of the child (this is the subject of chapter 2);
2. the emergence of a rights orientation has threatened to un-
couple the traditional linkage of rights and responsibilities,
subordinating the best interests of the child and the legitimate
needs of the state to parental preferences (this is the subject of
chapter 3); and
3. a renewed reliance on the trust model of parent-child relations
would better serve both the developing personhood of the child
and the civil society to which he or she belongs (this is the
subject of chapter 4).
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In each area of the law, we face the same historical reality: It is the rights ori-
entation that breaks with deeply rooted legal traditions and cultural values, 
rejecting time-honored trust principles of family law meant to protect both 
private and public interests. For the common law’s careful calculation of 
privileges and duties; for its vision of children’s needs as a source of positive 
claims on the state; for its sensitivity to evolving cultural mores, a focus on 
parental entitlement substitutes a negative rights wall behind which parents 
may bring up their children free from both state and nonstate interference. 
In this way, the “presentist” assumption that parental rights were always 
thus creates the entitlement mistakenly assumed to be a long-standing legal 
legacy. If we better understand that, as a descriptive matter, the right to par-
ent is at odds with a cultural tradition of shared responsibility for the welfare 
of the child, we might be more ready to ask whether, as a normative matter, 
the right to parent should have a fundamental status in the law. We might 
be more willing to consider how old equitable principles can lead to new 
ways of accommodating the interests of parent, child, and state.67
On occasion the Supreme Court has put the trust model to productive 
use. In adjudicating the due process claims of unmarried fathers, for ex-
ample, the Court has said that the rights of parents “are a counterpart of 
the responsibilities they have assumed.”68 This linkage of right and duty, 
according to the Court, is the true legacy of its seminal due process par-
enting cases. Constitutional parenthood embraces the Lockean principle 
that “[c]hildren are born to reason,” and the law of nature commands a 
parental duty to secure for them “that equal Right that every man hath to 
his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any 
other Man.”69 On this commitment to the child’s self-determination is predi-
cated the Founders’ theory of human dignity and, of particular salience for 
parent-child relations, the parallel theory of human development—the nor-
mative psychology of the law, we might say—that, taken together, sustain 
the Constitution’s promise of personal as well as political freedom.70 It is the 
carrying out of this commitment that defi nes the trust assumed by parents 
and against which parental efforts must be constitutionally measured and 
rewarded. Our political charter does not allow for, in or outside the home, 
“a utopian conception of society according to which an order having been 
laid down all that remains to do is to conform to it.”71
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“Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection 
between parent and child,” Justice Potter Stewart has said. “They require 
relationships more enduring.”72 But it is not every enduring parent-child 
relationship that merits constitutional protection. If this were the case, then 
compulsory schooling laws would fail against constitutional challenges 
brought by caring parents. Yet few would disagree that all parents are ob-
ligated to look after the educational welfare of their children. It is the trust 
model of parent-child relations that directs us to the particular charge that 
is the sine qua non of parental power: to secure the child’s “equal Right” to 
intellectual and moral autonomy (Locke’s “Natural Freedom”); or, more 
simply, to see that children, when they become adults, can choose what life 
they want to lead, what values they want to honor, what god they want to 
worship.
This duty presupposes that the child is free to form relationships with 
those outside the circle of the nuclear family. Hovering over the right to par-
ent is the long-lingering shadow of a property entitlement. Today, the right 
to parent is fashioned as a right to personal autonomy, a right of privacy; 
yet it remains, essentially, a right to do what one wants with what is “mine.” 
But if the child, at birth, “becomes a member of the human family,” then 
parents are not free to seclude the child from outside infl uence. “If we ask 
ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous,” Jennifer Nedel-
sky writes, “the answer is not isolation, but relationships—with parents, 
teachers, friends, loved ones—that provide the support and guidance neces-
sary for the development and experience of autonomy.” Thus, our children 
are not and cannot be “ours,” at least not exclusively, not permanently.73 
(We ought to be as careful as Shakespeare with possessive pronouns. When 
Hermia awakes from her tumultuous midsummer night’s “dream,” she fi nds 
Demetrius “like a jewel / Mine own, and not mine own.”)74 From birth, chil-
dren are members of a familial community outside and beyond the nuclear 
family; from birth, they are members of a political community outside and 
beyond the family. It is only by belonging that children can learn, by and for 
themselves, where they want to belong.
A trust model of parenting, with its assumption of shared authority over 
the child, need not evoke the specter of state paternalism. With regard to 
the child’s upbringing, the state also is and also must remain merely an 
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 educational trustee. The liberal state holds what Locke calls a “Fiduciary 
Power to act for certain ends.”75 Like the parent’s authority, the state’s power 
over the child is conditional and limited. Ideally, the state, like the ideal 
parent, would cultivate the child’s capacity to think and choose freely; it 
would foster the child’s courage to challenge any closed set of values, pub-
lic or private, liberal or conservative. The liberal state wants to pass on its 
traditions of freedom, equality, and tolerance, and no doubt the state, like 
real parents, can behave less than liberally toward its young people; but the 
surest way not to pass on these traditions would be to present them as moral 
absolutes to be accepted uncritically.76
For children, though, the threat to freedom of choice and conscience is 
no less grave when it comes from private orthodoxies, and the injury to the 
child caused by private coercion is no less grievous. In Meyer and Pierce, the 
Court feared that the state, through a regime of mandatory public educa-
tion, would “standardize its children.”77 Yet children sent to private schools 
or those kept at home might more easily suffer this fate. We are well cau-
tioned by the pioneering scholar and children’s advocate Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse that “[s]tamped on the reverse side of this coinage of family 
privacy and parental rights are the child’s voicelessness, objectifi cation, and 
isolation from the community.”78 For this reason, courts should look skepti-
cally at any educational scheme that seeks to restrict “the right to receive 
information and ideas.”79 The realm of intellect and spirit is invaded when 
children are forced to believe what other people believe, or kept from be-
lieving what other people do not believe, even if—and, perhaps, especially 
when—these others are their parents or educational and religious mentors. 
Thus, if we are not “to strangle the free mind at its source,” the state’s pa-
rens patriae duty must “cut[] against the differential regulation of public 
and private schools.”80 All children are entitled to an education that is, in 
the fullest sense, public: that transports them beyond familiar boundaries; 
that provides a check on the narcissism of their guardians, both public and 
private; that burdens them with the necessity of moral judgment; and that, 
fi nally, makes them truly free, free to stand and free to fall. A public edu-
cation is the portal by which children fi nd a place or places on “the great 
sphere” that is their world and legacy.81 It is their means of escape from or 
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free commitment to the social group in which they were born. It is their best 
guarantee of an open future.82
On this basis, the courts should refuse to allow parents to opt out of state-
mandated educational requirements they consider morally objectionable. 
On this basis, too, the courts should not allow parents to make the public 
school classroom a forum for their personal religious agenda. Yet if the class-
room really is, as the Supreme Court has said, “peculiarly the ‘marketplace 
of ideas,’ ” the voices of religious children must be allowed to be heard, too.83 
The educational market is a poorer place when school offi cials cleanse the 
classroom of religious references or deny children freedom of religious ex-
pression. To this end, the study of religion should be a regular part of a 
common curriculum. The public school classroom at every level should 
be a forum where students are exposed to diverse viewpoints, secular and 
religious. The idea that students benefi t from exposure to otherness makes 
sense only if this benefi t fl ows in all directions.
A truly public education may well divide child from parent. We should 
be entirely forthright and unapologetic about this. The state as educator is 
no ideologically neutral actor.84 The philosophical foundations supporting 
a public education are the liberal biases of our nation’s intellectual forebear-
ers, biases in favor of a nonauthoritarian approach to truth, of free argument 
and debate—what Thomas Jefferson called truth’s “natural weapons”—and 
of a healthy sense of human fallibility.85 The open world of public schooling 
should be a place where children use these “weapons” to think about values, 
whether those values belong to parent or state, or to the “omnivorous peer-
culture,” or to the cultural oligarchs of the marketplace and the media.86 
We should admit as well that these biases will be more compatible with the 
beliefs of some religious groups than others.87 Still, it would be a misrepre-
sentation of trust principles to associate them with antireligiosity. Indeed, a 
commitment to the child’s open future may be the best guarantee of a soci-
ety with rich and robust religious traditions. Children are natural religious 
seekers. (Recently, there has been talk of a religious generation gap, or, 
perhaps better put, a reverse religious generation gap, with children choos-
ing lives of faith, much to the concern, if not dismay, of their more secular-
minded parents.)88 As young adults, some will choose new spiritual paths 
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and some will choose to abandon religious ways altogether, but many, if not 
most, will fi nd their faith in traditional places, arriving where they started 
and perhaps knowing the place for the fi rst time.89 For religious freedom to 
fl ourish, however, these choices must be genuine ones, based on knowledge 
and experience gathered, as it were, out of a multitude of tongues. For the 
child’s sake, for its own sake, the state that protects the freedom of adults to 
choose a religious or a nonreligious path must also ensure that the freedom 
of children to choose their path will not be taken from them. Like adults, 
children must be free to seek as well as to fi nd a spiritual home.
The Constitution’s guarantee of personal freedoms is meaningful only 
if we, as parents, accept the responsibilities from which parental authority 
arises, and the constitutional strength of parenting privileges should depend 
on our willingness to do so. The real question is whether parenting fur-
thers the prospective independence of the child. No doubt, there are many 
ways to achieve this goal. Treating parental authority as a trust does not 
mean denying parents the opportunity, in the words of the political theorist 
William Galston, to introduce their children “to what they regard as vital 
sources of meaning and value.”90 It does mean that parents may not deny 
their children the opportunity to be introduced to new sources of meaning 
and value; it does mean that parents may not as a matter of right refuse to 
share authority for the upbringing of their children. There is, after all, more 
than one form of unlimited government to which children are vulnerable, 
and Justice Stevens is certainly correct to caution that “[t]he constitutional 
protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should 
not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the 
arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an 
interest in the welfare of the child.”91
The trust model of parent-child relations heeds this admonitory note. In 
their consideration of parenting claims, courts ought not to treat the legal 
question as one of parental rights divorced from parental duties.92 Our le-
gal traditions teach that parenthood is fi rst and foremost a responsibility, a 
fi duciary duty owed equally to the child and the state. This time-honored 
tenet has great room for play in modern times.93 If allowed to, the form 
this responsibility takes will evolve, for our understanding of children’s best 
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interests—indeed, our very conception of childhood—evolves. Our duty to 
the child, however, will remain unchanged.
Like a doctrinal will-o’-the-wisp, the fundamental right to parent con-
tinues to beckon constitutional travelers. It is a pursuit driven more by psy-
chology than law. The rhetoric of parental rights speaks to a yearning for 
control, for possession of something that is “mine.”94 It evokes some Edenic 
time when parents, by right, could tell the state to mind its own business. 
It evokes some Edenic place where parents, by right, could command obe-
dience from their children. But there never was such a time and place, 
certainly not in the law. In Meyer, the attorney Arthur Mullen stood before 
the Supreme Court to denounce the power of the state “to take the child 
from the parent.” No state, Mullen argued, should “prescribe the mental 
bill of fare” the child will follow.95 His argument supposes that by legal tra-
dition the child is the parent’s to begin with, that the parent can prescribe 
the child’s mental bill of fare. To the contrary, trust principles of parenting 
testify to the “moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not to others 
nor to society as a whole.”96
Though John Milton protested prepublication censorship, Milton’s God 
was less troubled by restrictions on the spectrum of available knowledge. 
When God’s children disobey his sole commandment—a commandment, 
interestingly enough, that would deny Adam and Eve the knowledge of 
good and evil—they are cast out of their childhood home and sentenced to 
death for their disobedience. In Milton’s telling, their fall, it turns out, is a 
fortunate one, their disobedience a prerequisite to “[a] Paradise within . . . , 
happier far.”97 The law of parent-child relations has long embodied a similar 
belief that education (a “leading away from”) is the path away from child-
hood and toward intellectual and moral enfranchisement. Unless children 
are to live under “a perpetual childhood of prescription,” unless we are to 
deny them the pursuit of happiness, perhaps in the fond hope of providing 
happiness, they must be exposed to the dust and heat of the race, intellectu-
ally, morally, spiritually.98
With all its attendant joys, parenting is a somber task, for it entails, in a 
profound and poignant way, the loss of the child. It is the parent’s task—it 
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is a political as well as a personal obligation—to enable each child to form 
his or her own self-image rather than merely to conform to some parental 
likeness. If we could, we might shield our children from the sufferings that 
accompany individuation. If we could, we might shield ourselves from the 
pain that accompanies the child’s separation from our hands. Is it any won-
der that we would want to transform the sacred trust of parenthood into a 
sacred right? But such a right comes at too great a cost. When Adam and 
Eve leave Paradise, as Milton recounts the story, they shed some natural 
tears, but “the World was all before them,” as it should be for all children as 
they enter on the path to adulthood.
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